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Summary findings
Defining famine as widespread, usually life-threatening,  institutions that work adequately, though not perfectly,
hunger or starvation, Ravallion observes that famine has  in normal times can fail under unusual stresses. Poor
occurred in most parts of the world in the twentieth  people can then be highly vulnerable.
century, killing many people. But famines are surely  Famine can be viewed as a tragic magnification of
more avoidable now than ever before.  normal market and governmental failures, says Ravallion.
Famines defy simple explanations and geographic  And the factors that can transform a shock into mass
boundaries, says Ravallion. They have happened under  starvation seem to be intrinsic features of normal
both socialist and capitalist economic systems, and with  economies rather than peculiar features of highly
and without wars or unusual political or social instability.  distorted or badly managed economies. Normally they
And economic analysis can help explain famines that in  are hidden from view, but they can surfacein a number
the past have been explained in terms of often doubtful  of ways.
single causes, such as a decline in aggregate food  Certain elements increase a region's vulnerability to
production.  famine:
Under certain conditions, the threat of mass starvation  * Poverty.
can emerge from seemingly  small shocks to an economy,  *  Weak social and physical infrastructure.
or from a steady - even slow - decline in average  *  A weak and unprepared government.
living standards. And similar, even large, shocks in  * A relatively closed political regime.
similar settings can have very different consequences.  Arguably the same factors constrain longer-term
Market and nonmarket (including government)  economic development, concludes Ravallion.
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Some doubtful starting points for the analysis of famine can easily get embedded in  its
definition. Common  usage allows two distinct definitions. One is that famine entails an extreme and
general scarcity of food while the other defines it as widespread, unusually life-threatening, hunger.
This paper follows the latter definition; I will say that a geographic area experiences famine when
unusually  high mortality risk is associated  with an unusually severe threat to the food consumption of
at least some people in the area.  This definition does not require that there be a contraction in the
aggregate availability of food-or  even in its aggregate consumption-for  famine to have occurred.
But life-threatening  starvation  is present (even though checks and balances may eventually come into
play to forestall mass starvation). Nor does this definition  require that the set of people who face death
is the same as the set of people who experience the threat to their food consumption; some may die
due to diseases that spread during famines.
By this definition, or something like it, the twentieth century has seen famines in most parts
of the world.  In Asia, famine occurred in Bengal (then part of British India) in 1943-44, and again
in 1974-75  (in what is now Bangladesh). China had a famine in 1959-61. In Africa, there have been
famines in Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger,  Angola, Zaire, Uganda, Somalia and
Liberia, and a number of these happened  since 1980. The former Soviet Union had three famines this
century.  In Western Europe, Holland suffered a famine in 1944-45.  A great many people died in
these famines, though we will probably never know with much accuracy how many.  I  And the lost
lives went hand in hand with lasting  miseries of material and other deprivations  for those lucky enough
to survive.  Yet surely (it has been said before) famines have been more avoidable this century than
ever before.
I  For example,  estimates  for the China  famine  range  from 15 to 30 million  people (this famine was
clearly  the worst  this century). (The  upper estimate  is that of Ashton  et al., 1984;  the lower one is based  on
official  mortality  rates;  see Riskin,  1990). The  variance  of estimates  is as great  for the Soviet  Union's  famines;
it is estimated  that  between  5 and  9 million  people  died  during  the 1921-22  famine,  and 5-11  million  died  in the
1932-33  famine, and 2-5 million  in the 1946-47  famine  (Dando,  1981). (Dalrymple,  1964,  quotes an even
wider  range  of mortality  estimates  for the 1932-33  famine,  namely  from 1-10  million.) The  Ethiopian  famine
of 1984-85  was clearly  the world's  worst  since  the 1970s,  with about  8 million  people  deemed  to have  been
affected  directly  of whom  1 million  are estimated  to have  died  (Kloos  and Lindtj6rn,  1993). But  nobody  seems
to have  much  confidence  in mortality  estimates  for this famine  either. On the difficulties  in estimating  famine
mortality  see Caldwell  and Caldwell  (1992).
2Famines continue to raise deep questions about the performance of economic and political
institutions.  Did those institutions help protect people from starvation, or did they make matters
worse?  Economists have sometimes tried to answer such questions and to influence public policies
towards famines. For example, the writings of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and John Stuart Mill
were used to support a laissez-faire policy with respect to food markets during the many famines in
the British Empire during the nineteenth  century. 2
From about 1980, a new literature on famines emerged, also premised on a view that the tools
of economic  analysis  can throw light on why famines  keep happening, and what can be done to prevent
or relieve them.  The new literature has revisited many of the classic nineteenth  century debates about
famines,  such as  the extent and nature of  appropriate governmental interventions in  markets.
Substantial progress has been made in developing a richer conceptual framework for understanding
famines.  Progress has also been made in advancing empirical knowledge. Some of the arguments
advanced  in past debates have been rigorously formulated and tested for the first time, though many
remain untested, either because of lack of data or lack of effort. The empirical study of famines has
posed a number of challenges. Traditional types of data and other forms of "fair-weather research"
(as Caldwell et al.,  1986, p.696, nicely put it) may be quite uninformative about these events.  For
example, sample surveys  during famines are rare, and aggregate data can be quite unreliable at these
times.  Studies  of famines have relied on a wider range of types of data than normally found in applied
economics; for example, accounts from direct observers, such as found in local newspaper reports,
have been an important source of data, when used carefully.
This article offers an overview of this new literature on famines, and what issues endure.  In
addition to looking at what economic analysis can teach us about famines, the article tries to say
something  about what economists  can learn from famines, including from the large body of work on
this topic by non-economists.  It is argued that the new literature suggests that famines can help
economists  and policy makers  understand  the tragic extremes to which otherwise  adequate  political and
economic institutions  can be driven  when exposed to certain shocks. To understand famines one must
understand how normal institutions work under stresses they do not normally confront.
2  See, for example,  Woodham-Smith  (1962)  on the famine  in Ireland  in 1846-7,  and Ambirajan  (1978),
Rashid  (1980)  and Dreze  (1990a)  on the numerous  famines  in British  India  during  the nineteenth  century.
3The  article first examines famines from  a micro perspective, emphasizing the multiple
determinants  of starvation and the likely nonlinearities. This is the topic of section II. The article then
looks at how the  various markets and institutions which coordinate individual choices performed
during famines. Section III takes up these issues. It argues that famines arise from severe aperiodic
market  and institutional failures in  economies under  stress.  Arrangements collapse which had
previously  worked adequately. Understanding  why that can happen helps us understand famines, and
to understand  the functioning  of those institutions.  Governments  are amongst  the institutions  that often
fail during famines, though recent literature also reports some real successes in intervention. Section
IV tries to draw out some lessons for policy.  Conclusions can be found in section V.
II  Microfoundations
Attempts to understand the causes of famines, and what to do about them, have traditionally
focused on a rather small set of economy-wide  parameters,  notably aggregate  food availability  and the
rate of population growth. 3 The main distinguishing  feature of the new economic  literature on famines
is its emphasis on understanding the circumstances of individuals in famine-vulnerable  settings, and
how those circumstances interact with economy-wide  variables.
I  The entitlements approach and its critics
Famine is often blamed on some aggregate exogenous shock.  This simple causal model can
be questioned from a number of points of view.  A shock of some sort can always be identified; a
famine does not seem to have ever happened  by "spontaneous  combustion". The most common shocks
are spells of unusually bad weather and wars.  It is not always obvious that the "shock" should be
considered  exogenous  to the population  in which the famine occurs; for example, a war is the outcome
of certain peoples' choices for which famine can be a predictable or even deliberate outcome.  But
even similar exogenous shocks  can produce quite dissimilar  outcomes, depending  on initial inequalities
in physical and human assets, the way the economy works given those inequalities, and the policies
pursued in response to the shock.  Some people suffer badly, while others may even gain.  Yes, a
3  This  article  will  not address  the  demography  of famines,  except  to note that  the Malthusian  view that
famines  act as a check  on population  growth  has been  discredited  (Watkins  and Menken,  1985;  Caldwell  and
Caldwell,  1992;  Fogel, 1992). For an overview  of the  debates  on demographic  causes  and consequences  of
famine  see Osmani  (1996).
4shock of some sort can invariably  be identified  at the start of the chain of events leading to a specific
famine, but to properly  understand-and prevent-the  famine one must understand  that chain of events.
A better approach is to work from the perspective of those who suffer.  That is the enduring
lesson from the first and most influential contribution in the new literature on famines, namely
Amartya Sen's (1981) book, Poverty and Famines.  This book was very much an economic analysis
of famines, though it succeeded in attracting the interest of both economists and non-economists.
Many economists  were introduced  to an important  but somewhat  neglected  set of economic issues, and
it offered many non-economists  an insightful new perspective on those issues.
The central concept in Sen's approach is an individual's "entitlement  set", defined as all the
commodity  bundles that can be obtained from all the resources at the individual's command in a given
society, subject to the laws of that society.  Starvation is then seen to arise from an "entitlement
failure", meaning that an individual's entitlement set no longer includes enough food to stay alive.
The failure can take any one of a number of forms, reflecting  the fact that ". .people establish  command
over food in many different ways" (Sen, 1990, p.34).  The entitlement failure could be due to a loss
of endowments, or to a change in one or more of the various ways-through  production, trade or
transfers-in  which endowments  are transformed into entitlements. If a sufficiently large number of
individuals experience an entitlement failure then a famine occurs.
One possible starting point for a chain of events leading to entitlement  failure is a crop failure,
such as due to a drought or flood.  It is certainly true that some famines have been associated with a
sharp drop in domestic food output. 4 However, Sen (1981) rejected this as a universal explanation.
A number of empirical studies have confirmed  his conclusion that famines have quite often happened
without a decline in current aggregate food availability. 5 In some cases (including some severe
famines) there was a food-availability  decline (FAD) but it was relatively modest-more like a 10%
4  See, for example,  Sen (1981)  on the famine  in the Sahel  in 1972-74,  McAlpin  (1983)  on the famines
in Western  India  in the late  nineteenth  century,  Nolan  (1993)  on the Soviet  famines  in 1931-33,  and the Chinese
famine  of 1959-61,  and Lin and Yang  (1995)  on the latter  famine.
5  Amongst  others, see Fogel  (1992)  on famines  in Europe  between  1500  and 1800,  Ghose  (1982)  on the
famines  in nineteenth  century  India,  Greenough  (1992)  on the Great  Bengal  Famine,  Alamgir  (1980)  on the
Bangladesh  famine  of 1974-75;  and Locke  and Ahmadi-Esfahani  (1993)  on the famine  in Sudan  in the mid-
1980s.
5drop in current food output than anything one could reasonably call a "crop failure".6  In still other
cases there was a small FAD, but after the rise in mortality.'
The link from aggregate food availability to starvation involves numerous economic and
political factors.  FAD need not cause mass entitlement failure; indeed some severe crop failures in
poor countries have not resulted in famines. 8 And there are other possible starting points, including
wars which disrupt the production  and/or flow of food and other commodities within an economy, or
a speculative  crisis in food markets triggered by rumors of impending  shortages. The ability of Sen's
approach to encompass  various "single  cause" explanations  for farnines  within a single framework  has
been an important part of its appeal (Reutlinger, 1984; Osmani, 1995).
An often vociferous  debate was instigated  by Sen's writings on famines. 9 Some critics argued
that Sen attaches too much importance to food, and too little on other factors such as disease.  For
example, drawing on field work in Dafur, Sudan, de Waal (1989) argues that it was not starvation but
an unsafe health environment  while migrating  that caused death.  Others argued that Sen undervalues
the importance  of aggregate  food availability,  and that in doing so he risks misinforming famine policy
and thus worsening the situation (see, for example, Bowbrick, 1986, and Devereux, 1988).'°  And
some critics have questioned whether Qnly  people facing current entitlement failure will go hungry,
pointing to evidence  that poor people with ample entitlements  may prefer to go hungry at certain times
6  Examples  include  the Great Bengal  Famine  of 1943  in which food output  was only 5% below its
average  of the preceding  five  years (Sen, 1981,  p.58), and famines  in Ethiopia  and Sudan  during 1983-84  in
which  food output  was 11  % and 13%  (respectively)  below  its level  in 1979-81  (Dreze,  1990b).
7  For example,  the harvest  after the worst  months  of the 1974-75  Bangladesh  famine  was about  five
percent  lower than  the pre-famine  harvest,  which  was above  average  (based  on Boyce,  1987).
a  For example,  Dreze  (1990b)  points  out that, at the same  time as the severe  famines  in Ethiopia  and
Sudan  in 1983-84,  far larger  food  output  declines  (around  a 40% loss  of output)  had occurred  in Cape  Verde
and Zimbabwe  yet there  was no famine  in those  countries-indeed,  mortality  declined. Also  see Sen's (1981,
Chapter  8) discussion  of the diverse  outcomes  in the Sahel  in 1972-74,  despite  common  shocks.
9  An excellent  overview  of this debate  can be found  in Osmani  (1994). Also  see Desai's (1988)  and
Devereux's  (1993b,  Chapter  6) discussions  of the various  critiques  of the entitlements  approach.
'°  Problems  of measuring  food availability,  and conflicting  estimates,  have fueled  some critics, though
at least  one appears  to be driven  by faith  alone;  Cutler  (1993,  pp.72-3)  asserts  that "Food  availability  decline
is always  an element  of famine...,even  if [it]  is not measurable  at national  or regional  level".
6rather than sell their assets.  "  While agreeing with the basic message, other critics have said there is
nothing new in the "entitlements"  approach, claiming instead that it is a long-standing  explanation of
famines dressed in new garb (Srinivasan, 1983; Rangasami, 1985; Clay, 1991).
In retrospect, I do not think one could reasonably  say that all of this debate has been insightful
or  interesting.  Some has  been based  on misunderstandings of Sen's  approach.  A  common
misunderstanding is the claim that Sen proposes entitlement failure as a non-nested altemative
explanation to  FAD;  for example, Devereux (1988,  1993b) interprets FAD as a  "supply side"
explanation  of famine, while Sen's is a "demand  side" explanation. Such an interpretation is not well
founded in Sen (1981) where he makes clear that the entitlements approach should be seen as an
encompassing framework, within which food availability is only one parameter.
Some critics have seen the entitlements approach as too "static", pointing to anthropological
and other (anecdotal  but credible)  evidence that avoiding current hunger may not be the main motive
for coping efforts (Jodha, 1975; Corbett, 1988; de Waal,  1989).  The entitlements approach can,
however, be readily be extended to accommodate  intertemporal  choice by recognizing  that people may
choose a  degree of hunger now in order to avoid starving in the future.' 2 In an inter-temporal
consumption model with borrowing constraints and random income fluctuations, a "stock-out" will
eventually  occur such that all remaining  assets are consumed,  at which point the household will clearly
be highly vulnerable  to a bad income  draw (Deaton, 1989; Alderman, 1995). The threat of a stock-out
can explain the observation  that some famine-vulnerable  households  initially forgo consumption rather
than deplete assets. That is not inconsistent  with the entitlements  approach.
Some of the criticisms  of the entitlements  approach  have also been tangential  at best to the main
point.  For example, the fact that there were antecedents  of the entitlements approach, particularly in
the literature on famines in nineteenth  century India, does not appear to be at issue (Sen, 1990; Dreze,
1990a). The nineteenth century literature on famines in India was still, however, firmly anchored to
the view that crop failure due to drought or flooding was the ultimate cause of famines, though
"  While such  behavior  has often  been noted  (see Jodha, 1975,  and Corbett,  1988,  amongst  others),  its
interpretation  as something  deemed  to be inconsistent  with the entitlements  approach  appears  to be due to de
Waal  (1989). Also see Devereux  (1993a).
12  This point  was  anticipated  by Sen (1981,  p.50)  and answers  de Waal's  (1989)  and Devereux's  (1993a)
criticisms  of Sen's approach.
7recognizing  that various factors intervened  in determining  the household-level  impact, including  access
to  other employment opportunities.  The same narrowness in the conceptualization  of famines is
evident in some recent writings. The term "entitlement"  has also generated  some confusion. The tern
carries a normative  connotation,  although the intended  meaning in this context is entirely positive; Sen
(1981, p.2) was careful to point this out, and specifically  to distinguish  his usage of the word from the
normative meaning found in, for example, Nozick's (1974) "entitlement" theory of justice.
Some of the issues  that have been raised in the debates over the entitlements  approach are more
substantive. One of these is the fact that what constitutes an "entitlement" is conditional on a specific
legal system, as this defines property rights and (hence) personal endowments. If famines entail the
collapse of law and order,  it will be meaningless to search for an explanation in terms of legal
entitlements.  This problem too was recognized by Sen (1981,  p.49), as well as some reviewers
(including Appadurai, 1984). The extent to which it undermines the economic analysis of famines is
an empirical question.  Here one should be careful to distinguish a collapse of quasi-cooperative,
"informal",  arrangements for risk-sharing and assistance for the poor from a collapse of the legal
apparatus which defines  and enforces  property rights.  Endowments  remain well defined in the former
case, but not the latter; and while there is evidence (reviewed later) that the former often collapses
during famines, it does not appear to be the case that the latter commonly does." 3 Starvation and its
avoidance are for the most part legal.
Another substantive  issue is the role health plays.  Sen's (1981, Appendix A) characterization
of entitlement failure as a cause of starvation assumes the existence of a consumption 'floor',  above
which one lives, but below which one dies.  14 Similarly,  the models  of competitive  equilibrium which
have included sufficient  conditions  for human survival in equilibrium, have assumed that there exists
a well-defined  lower bound on individual  consumption  which is necessary  and sufficient for individual
survival (Coles and Hammond, 1994; McGregor, 1996).  Failure to reach some well-defined food
consumption  level is clearly a rather simple view of what determines  mortality during a famine.  Food
is not the only thing that matters.  For example, it has often been observed that an important  proximate
cause of death in famines is exposure to disease  associated  with a poor health environment, especially
13  Though  there  are clear  exceptions,  such as the famine  in Somalia  in the early 1990s.
14  For  convenience,  I shall  treat  this  consumption  floor  as a well-defined  quantity  of a homogeneous  good.
More generally  it will be a vector. See Sen (1981,  Appendix  A) for a general  statement.
8amongst those who migrate during famines (Sen, 1981, Appendix D; Jansson et al.,  1987; de Waal,
1989; Dyson, 1991; Seaman, 1993; Young and Jaspers, 1995). There is clearly latent inter-personal
variability and, hence, uncertainty about survival prospects.
Some critics of the entitlements  approach have downplayed  command over food as a factor in
explaining famine mortality, arguing that the health environment is far more important (see, for
example, de Waal, 1989). These are not, however, independent  causes.  The health environment is
determined in part by the same variables determining consumptions; for example, the exposure to
disease of migrating people during a famine is not exogenous, but (it can be argued) an outcome of
the same entitlement failures which led to migration in search of food.  And while starvation is not
often identified as the proximate cause of death during famines, it does appear to have a strong
potentiating effect on the incidence and severity of infectious diseases (Scrimshaw, 1990; Taylor,
1985; Pelletier et al., 1995).  '5  It has also become clear that in understanding the synergies amongst
undernutrition  and susceptibility  to infection  one should consider  more that the biological relationship
(as might be identified in a controlled experiment in which one measures the infection rate for some
disease as food is progressively withdrawn from a single person).  Behavior can generate a strong
synergy even if biology does not.  One clearly wants a theory which allows for other factors
influencing famine mortality,  both  directly and  via their  impact on  the  effect of  changes in
consumption. However, that need not mean that command over food is any less important than one
would have otherwise thought.
What issues endure, more than 15 years after the publication  of Povertv and Famines? We can
surely agree that FAD has limited power to explain famines, which have happened with and without
FAD. We can agree that the proximate  causes of famine have much more to do with entitlements and
(hence) economics.  But that still leaves many questions begging.  Is starvation only a matter of
entitlement  failure? What determines  vulnerability  to famines? Can similar shocks  yield very different
outcomes?  What causes the entitlement  failure? Why is it covariate  over so many people? Do markets
and (governmental  and non-governmental)  institutions  help or hinder the way aggregate shocks impact
15  The  same  comment  applies  to some  other  causes  of death  during  a famine. For example,  suicide  may
be the immediate  cause  of death,  but the hunger  of that person  or someone  close  to her is not far behind  the
scene; drawing  on field  work in Bangladesh  during  the 1979  drought,  BRAC  (1979, p.1 1) writes that: "One
woman  in Rowmari  became  simply  unable  to stand  the  cries  of her hungry  children  and, leaving  them  uncared,
hanged  herself'.
9on entitlements?  This article will review what the new literature on famines (within and outside
economics) has had to say about these questions.  The rest of this section will look at theory and
evidence on the link between entitlements  and mortality; later sections will take up issues concerning
the causes of mass entitlement failure, and the implications for policy.
2  Micro-level determinants of mortality
Borrowing from another Sen concept, starvation is fundamentally a capabifity-failur,  rather
than a lack of command over commodities  per se." 6 The ability to avoid starvation depends in part on
current consumptions, but also on the health-relevant aspects of the individual's environment, and
various idiosyncratic  attributes  of the individual  which may depend on past health and consumptions.
Building  on work in related fields, including  health economics and nutrition science, recent literature
on famines has begun to investigate these links both theoretically and empirically, though a number
of issues remain poorly resolved.
There have been a few recent theoretical studies of aspects of economic  behavior in settings
in which survival prospects are endogenous  (Gersovitz, 1983; Ravallion, 1987; Glomm and Palumbo,
1993;  Carraro,  1996).  Following  standard practice  in  much  microeconomic analysis of  the
determinants of health, one can postulate a "health production function" relating individual health
attainments to individual  consumptions,  personal attributes (interpretable  as "personal constitution"),
and characteristics of the individual's immediate health environment. 17 Assume also that there is a
minimum level of health needed to survive. The probability that a person will survival in any period
is then the probability that his or her personal constitution  assures that health is above this floor, given
consumptions and the health environment.  The mapping from the consumption space to survival
probabilities can be termed the "survival function".  This is not a purely biological function, since it
depends  on behavior (including  the impact  of individual  consumption  choices  on health), and the socio-
economic environment (as it determines  the health enviromnent facing the individual).
16  On  the  meaning  of "capabilities"  and their  relationship  to other  conceptualizations  of well-being  see Sen
(1985).
''  For an exposition  of this approach  see Behrman  and Deolalikar  (1988). For an example,  see Pitt  et al.,
(1990).
10If the health production function is quasi-concave  in consumption and personal constitution,
and the probability density function of personal constitution is unimodal, then it can be shown that
beyond a critical value needed to assure at least a non-negligible chance of living, extra consumption
will have a decreasing marginal impact on the probability of survival i.e, the survival chance will be
concave from above in consumption  (Ravallion, 1987, Chapter 2).  There will still be a "live or die"
point in consumption space, if only because a certain amount of food energy is essential to maintain
bodily functions  at rest.  However, in discussing  famine causation and relief policy the more relevant
sub-set of the consumption  space is where the marginal  effect of a change in consumption on survival
chance will tend to increase as consumption falls.  This has a number of implications for both
understanding famines, and  for policies to avoid or  relieve famines.  Before examining those
implications, let us first look at the empirical evidence on the determinants of famine mortality.
There can be little hope of rigorously testing the relationships econometrically on suitable
micro data collected under famine conditions.  However, two sources of data still offer hope of
throwing new light on these issues.  The first is microdata for famine-vulnerable  or similar settings
under normal conditions.  There is inequality even in poor economies; so there is scope for using
cross-sectional variances and covariances at normal times to infer things about the determinants of
mortality  at  abnormal  times.  There  remains,  however,  the  real  concern  that  the  underlying
relationships  may well be so sharply nonlinear that observations  from normal times may be deceptive.
I will return to this point.
Supportive evidence from micro data of  a nonlinear relationship between mortality and
consumptions  that can be found in studies by nutritionists  and others indicating  that mortality  risk rises
sharply  at low nutritional status as measured by  anthropometric indicators (Chen et al.,  1980;
Heywood, 1982; Seaman and Rivers, 1988; Dasgupta, 1993, Chapter 14; Pelletier et al., 1995; Young
and Jaspers, 1995).
There have also been a number of microeconometric investigations  of the determinants of
nutritional status,  though invariably based on data produced under non-famine conditions.  An
important strand of this micro-literature in development economics has aimed to quantify the effects
of income changes on nutritional status.  There has been a debate on the magnitude of the income
11effect on nutrition in poor countries.'8 In normal times, the average income elasticity of food energy
intake may well be quite low even in poor rural settings; a number of studies have found elasticities
around 0.05-0.1 (see the survey by Bouis and Haddad, 1993).  However, this could easily rise to 0.2-
0.4 amongst  poor people in such settings.  If one also factors in the nonlinearity between nutritional
status and food-energy  intake, one can find quite strong income effects on nutritional status amongst
the  very  poor;  elsewhere I  have argued that the income elasticity of the  incidence of  severe
undernutrition in a poor economy is around unity, even though individual food-energy intake at the
mean has a low income elasticity (Ravallion, 1990a).
The reverse causation has also received attention.  Here too a nonlinearity is plausible;
conservation of energy in a steady state makes it impossible to  support productive work unless
consumption  is sufficient  to cover the body's food-energy  needs at rest (Dasgupta, 1993, Chapter 14),
but at higher levels of consumption further gains are unlikely to help raise productivity; this is the
nutrition-productivity  relationship  built into the well-known "efficiency wage hypothesis".  9 There is
now supportive evidence from a number of micro studies that nutritional status can also affect
consumption via its impacts on productivity (see the survey by Strauss and Thomas, 1995).  Again
these studies have been at normal times.  But if anything one would expect the effects to be even
stronger during famines.  Later I will discuss possible implications for understanding famines.
Another lesson from micro data collected during non-famine times is that the welfare impacts
of price and exogenous income changes can be highly diverse, even amongst poor people.  Clearly
behavior  is geared in part to protecting  living standards, 20 though some people will obviously be better
able to do so than others. Households  with chronically poor endowments,  or whose endowments  have
been run down by a series of shocks, will be particularly vulnerable.  Net trading position in food
is  See Behrman  and Deolalikar  (1987),  Ravallion  (1990a),  Strauss  and Thomas  (1995),  Subramanian  and
Deaton (1996),  and Ullah  and Roy (1996). For a recent overview  of this debate see Lipton  and Ravallion
(1995, section  4.4).
'9  This  has implications  for (inter  alia)  the  ways  labor  markets  work in poor economies  (Mirrlees,  1975;
Stiglitz,  1976;  Bliss  and Stern, 1978;  Dasgupta  and Ray, 1986;  Dasgupta,  1993). Section  III will discuss  this
topic  further  in the context  of famines.
20  There  is a large  literature  on consumption  smoothing  and risk-sharing  in developing  economies;  recent
contributions  include  Deaton  (1989, 1992),  Rosenzweig  and Binswanger  (1993), Rosenzweig  and Wolpin
(1993),  Paxson  (1993),  and Townsend  (1994). Also  see Foster  (1995)  on the effects  of borrowing  constraints
on child nutritional  status.
12markets  also varies  amongst  the poor. Peasants  with enough land to be net producers of food will gain
from higher food prices, but other peasants and landless laborers will probably lose, though even
amongst  the latter  group, some will be protected  by longer-term  contracts. All this helps explain another
empirical observation about famines: the victims often come disproportionately  from certain strata of
the poor, such as artisans and casual agricultural laborers (Alamgir, 1980; Sen, 1981; Desai, 1989;
Razzaqueetal.,  1990; Bidingeretal.,  1991; Foster, 1995).
The second source of relevant information is more aggregate, and possibly less reliable, data
collected  during famines. Evidence on the importance  of prices and incomes to current consumptions
during famines has come from diverse sources.  Both (anecdotal) qualitative and (more limited)
quantitative studies of specific famines have identified a large increase in the price of food as an
important proximate cause of food entitlement collapse.  Discussions of famines in South Asia have
emphasized  the role of foodgrain prices (Bhatia, 1967; Alamgir, 1980; Sen, 1981; Ravallion, 1987;
Dyson,  1991).  Similarly, analyses of the recent famines in the pastoral economies of rural Africa
(including Ethiopia, Sudan and the countries of the Sahel) have identified the prices of food staples
(particularly relative to livestock prices) as key variables influencing  mortality (Sen, 1981; Stryker,
1993; Ulrich, 1993; Khan, 1994; von Braun et al., 1994). And the price of food staples  has been cited
as one of the factors influencing  the fluctuations  in mortality observed in Europe during early modem
times (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981; Galloway, 1985; Walter and Schofield, 1989).
While  there has been no shortage of evidence confirming that entitlement failures have
underlain specific famines, the evidence  has been less informative  about some important aspects  of the
precise ways in which entitlement  changes impact on mortality.  Key here is the nature and extent of
the nonlinearities in this relationship.
The nonlinearity with regard to the price of food staples is an  important issue for both
understanding famine causation and for relief policy. The arguments and evidence reviewed above
suggest  that survival chances  will be concave in consumption. Micro data on the characteristics of the
poor in famine-vulnerable  settings  also suggests  that vulnerable  groups  rely heavily on current foodgrain
markets. 2" These conditions  do not, however, imply that survival chance will be concave in food price,
since food demand functions  are likely  to be convex in price. In discussing this question it is useful to
21  For a survey  of evidence  on the poverty  profile in low-income  countries  see Lipton  and Ravallion
(1995).
13work with the survival function defined on prices and incomes (by solving out quantities consumed),
although  for the purposes  of the argument  one need not assume that individual  consumption  choices are
survival maximizing.
Small price increases  may entail large increases  in mortality amongst sub-groups of the poor if
survival  chances are increasing and sufficiently concave functions of income (Ravallion, 1987). And
if these conditions hold then price variability over time will increase expected famine mortality. The
critical value of the elasticity of slope will depend  on properties  of the food demand function; high price
and income elasticities  of demand, and low budget shares for the stored good, tend to raise the critical
level of concavity  needed to benefit from price stabilization. For example, if income is fixed and all of
it is spent on food then survival  chance will be concave in the price of food if and only if the elasticity
of slope with respect to consumption exceeds two. 22
This is an empirical  question. Econometric  investigations  of the relationship  between mortality
and foodgrain  prices over periods  encompassing  two severe  famines in South  Asia (South India in 1877
and Bangladesh 1974-75)  indicate  that high and unstable prices contributed substantially  to the excess
mortality;  on regressing  the death rate against a suitable nonlinear  function  of the price of the main food
staple, mortality in both famines was found to be  an increasing concave function of price (Ravallion,
1987, Chapter 2).
Arguably  the single  most important  relative  price determining  the prospects of starvation in most
famine-vulnerable  economies is the foodgrain purchasing  power of the wage rate for unskilled labor,
which is more often than not the wage for casual agricultural  labor. Figure I plots the number of deaths
by month in one rural area during a period  encompassing  the Bangladesh  famine of 1974-75  against the
rice purchasing power of the agricultural wage rate in that area. Counts of deaths during a famine are
notoriously  unreliable,  but the series  used in this Figure is likely to be quite accurate. 23 There is a strong
22  To see why, let  s(x) be the probability  of surviving  the current  period  when  consuming  an amount  x of
food. When  all income  is spent  on food,  x=m/p  where  m is money  income  and  p is the price  of food. Since  (by
assumption)  money  income  is unaffected  by a change  in the price  of food,  on differentiating  twice  with respect
top one finds  that  s(x) is concave  inp if and  only  if -x.s"(x)/s'(x)  > 2. For a more  general  formulation,  relaxing
some of these assumptions,  see Ravallion  (1987, Chapter  2).  Also  see Newbery  and Stiglitz  (1981)  for a
general  discussion  of the welfare  effects  of price stabilization.
23  The  area  is Matlab  Thana,  in which the  Intemational  Centre  for  Diarrhoeal  Disease  Research  Bangladesh
(ICDDRB)  happened  to be doing  field  research  which  allowed  a careful  monitoring  of deaths  during  and after  the
famine.  The  beginning  of the  rise  in deaths  can  be pinpointed  clearly  from  the  ICDDRB  data  at around  June 1974,
14negative  relationship,  and an indication  that the absolute  marginal impact of higher real wages tends to
fall as wages rise. The fitted line in Figure I is the regression  of the log of the number of deaths against
the log of the real wage rate; the regression coefficient (interpretable  as an elasticity) is -0.55 which is
significantly different from zero at the 1% level (the standard error is 0.09).24
However,  notice that the strong overall relationship  in Figure 1 nearly vanishes after the famine;
on excluding the famine period, the regression coefficient drops to -0.29, and is not significantly
different  from zero at the 5% level,  though it is at 10% level (the standard  error is 0.16). A nonlinearity
is again evident in mortality responses  to shifts in entitlements.
Other variables mentioned  in the famines  literature as factors influencing  mortality include the
health environment and access to health care.  Though that is plausible, there is little hard evidence
on the impacts of these factors under famine conditions.  Again micro data from poor economies
during normal times has thrown some light on the impacts of these factors, though there are some
serious concerns about endogeneity  in regressing (say) child mortality on (inter alia) access to health
care.'  Aggregate  cross-country  data do suggest that differences in public health spending  matter more
to mortality amongst  the poor than non-poor (Bidani  and Ravallion, 1996). It can also be hypothesized
that health-related variables enter non-additively in that sickness not only lowers survival chance at
a given consumption  level but may also add to the adverse marginal impact on mortality of a drop in
food intake (as argued by Young and Jasper, 1995). Plausibly, some of these other variables will also
have  lagged  impacts,  and  so  mortality  will  be  a  dynamic variable  which  depends  on  past
circumstances. So the long-run response of mortality amongst vulnerable groups to lower food
consumption may be higher than the short-run response.
From the limited evidence  available,  it can be argued  that either an increase in the price of food
staples  or an income loss  will put upward  pressure  on mortality,  but that these variables  only have strong
(or possibly  even noticeable) effects when prices are initially high and/or incomes are low. A marked
and  the death  rate  was  not  to return  to its  pre-famine  level  for a full  two years. I have  collated  the ICDDRB  data
with  independent  monthly  data  on wage  rates  for casual  agricultural  labor  and course  rice  prices  collected  by  the
Bangladesh  Bureau  of Statistics  for  Cornilla  district  (in which  Matlab  Thana  is located).
24  The  R 2 is 0.60, and the Durbin-Watson  statistic is 1.40. The regression  comfortably  passed  LM tests
for first-order  serial correlation,  functional  form, normality  and heteroscedasticity.
25  For further  discussion  and an attempt  to resolve  these  problems  see Pitt  et al. (1995).
15nonlinearity in the response is to be expected.  It can also be argued that at initially lower incomes
(higher  food prices) there will be a higher  mortality response  from food price increases  (income losses).
Though some important  clues have emerged from both micro data collected mainly under non-famine
conditions and more aggregate data collected during famines, there is still  much to do in tasting and
quantifying these relationships.
Figure  1: Mortality  and wages  in a
rural area of Bangladesh
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163  Implications for understanding famines
Nonlinearity in the relationship between mortality and consumption holds a  number of
implications  for understanding  famine causation. It implies that there will be long-term survival gains
from stabilizing  the consumption  of a given person over time. Equalizing consumption over time will
not in general be optimal since  the marginal impact  of consumption  on survival  chances will vary with
other time varying factors such as the health enviromnent. Conversely, sufficient de-stabilization of
consumption over time will worsen or even produce a famine.  Similarly, certain unequalizing re-
distributions of consumption will increase expected mortality. However (since the survival function
may vary between people), an equal distribution of a fixed supply of food need not necessarily
minimize expected  mortality. Nonetheless,  inequality  increasing  transfers  of sufficient  size will clearly
add to the death toll.
Concavity of the survival function also implies that a small drop in food consumption for a
large number of vulnerable  people  can entail a large increase in aggregate  mortality. A sharp increase
in mortality may thus be preceded by a steady (even slow) deterioration in the food consumption of
vulnerable  groups. This nonlinearity  can be exacerbated by shifts in the survival function associated
with a worsening health environment. Average food consumption of the poor in Bangladesh was on
a downward trend for a decade or so prior to the 1974-75 famine (Ravallion, 1995).  Though the
evidence  is less conclusive, a similar process appears to have been at work prior to recent famines in
Ethiopia, Sudan and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan  Africa (Jansson et al., 1987; Kumar, 1990; Webb et
al., 1992; von Braun et al., 1994).26
The lesson here for understanding  famines  is not to look Qrny  for a past history of decline (for
that is clearly not a necessary  condition), but rather to question the still widespread tendency to look
for a  sudden and  sizeable shock to food entitlements as an  essential primitive factor in  famine
causation.  Such shocks are certainly common, but their impact may crucially depend on the recent
consumption history of vulnerable groups.  Nor does this mean that the onset of famine is easily
predicted.  The point at which a sharp escalation in mortality will occur is still quite uncertain.
26  Also  see  Rangasami (1984,  1985) who emphasizes the  importance of  understanding the
"impoverishment  process"  which leads  up to the observed  escalation  in mortality,  and Currey (1992) who
questions  the common  view  of famines  as "discrete  events".
17Concavity of the individual  survival  function only holds above some point.  Survival for more
than a brief period, or any form of activity, is only possible if nutrition is adequate for the body's
functions at rest.  Such "nonconvexities"  may hold insights for understanding  hunger and behavior
with greatly contracted food entitlements.  With sufficiently low aggregate command over food in
some group (family, village, or relief camp) it will be optimal from the point of view of aggregate
mortality to distribute food quite unequally. This may happen at normal times in very poor families
(Lipton, 1983). Nonconvexities  suggest one possible explanation  of the above average mortality rates
observed in certain sub-groups  (children and the elderly) during famines; possibly these reflect corner
solutions to the problem of minimizing aggregate mortality in a family or village.  However, this is
not much more than a conjecture since there has been little research into testing for such corner
solutions. And there are other explanations, including non-cooperative behavior within the relevant
groups, or the collapse of institutional arrangements for redistribution and insurance, since at low
aggregate availability the pressure for the group to break up can also be strong.
The nonlinearity  of mortality  to food price changes  that has been found for famines in which it
has been  possible to do the necessary  tests also holds implications  for famine causation  and relief policy.
Simulations  using the econometric models of the effects of food price changes on mortality estimated
for  the  aforementioned famines in  South India and  Bangladesh indicated that  foodgrain price
stabilization would have reduced famine mortality (Ravallion, 1987, Chapter 2).  This is so even if
mean price had remained unchanged;  more plausibly, aggregate demand functions for food staples are
convex in price, so price stabilization  at a fixed aggregate  supply would also have  entailed a lower mean
price, with further reductions in mortality. (Section IV will return to the policy issues on how best to
stabilize prices.) The concavity in price also suggests  that the underlying survival function is concave
in income; indeed, the income elasticity of the income derivative of the survival function must be
presumed to be high, undoubtedly exceeding two. This suggests that famine mortality may be quite
sensitive to changes in interpersonal  inequality.
Possibly the most serious limitation of the above discussion is that it has been largely static.
By this view, life-threatening entitlement failures arise from current events only.  This limits our
understanding  of famines. A simple model illustrates  how.  Following the standard  assumption  of the
efficiency wage hypothesis, let current productivity depends on current food consumption in a
nonlinear way, such that some positive consumption level is essential for any work effort, but that
18beyond some level of consumption  the marginal gains from extra consumption start to fall.  Suppose,
however, that there is a lag in the consumption  impact of a change in  productivity,  and (in particular)
that current consumption  is proportional to last period's productivity. Then we can write consumption
Ct  at date t as a nonlinear function f(Ct ,) of consumption at date t-1, as depicted in Figure 2.
Figure  2: Similar  shocks,
but dissimilar  outcomes
C  t
I  ICt=f(Ct,)
O  cB  cA  C*  ct-l
Carraro (1996) provides a dynamic model with these features, in which the dynamics arises
from the (plausible)  assumption  that current agricultural  output depends on lagged labor inputs.  There
are other possibilities too.  The usual static productivity-nutrition  relationship  can be interpreted  as the
19steady state solution  of a dynamic of energy-conservation  equation;  the static relationship  assumes that
there is no change in the body's stock of stored energy (Dasgupta, 1993, Chapter  14).  For the
purposes at hand one would not want to make that assumption; people starving in a famine will be
running down their stores.  Thus productivity  in any period will depend in part on past consumption.
A nonlinear dynamic  model similar to Figure 2 can then be obtained  even without lags in realizing the
consumption impact of productivity changes.
Various dynamic behaviors for consumption can be explained by such a model.  Figure 2
illustrates  a case with three steady-state  equilibria  (in which C,=Ct  C),  only two of which entail positive
consumption  (of which only the higher one, at C', is stable). Suppose  the initial equilibrium is at C,
but that there is a shock to current consumption  driving it down to CA. The dynamic adjustments will
entail that consumption  eventually  returns to C*. However, at only a slightly larger shock, enough to
drive current consumption down to CB, the outcome will be very different; the dynamics will then
drive consumption down to zero.  In one case there is a short-lived contraction, in the other there is
a sustained fall in consumption.  By combining such nonlinear dynamics in consumption with the
aforementioned nonlinearity in the survival function one can see why the effects on mortality might
also be very different (Carraro, 1996).
Nonlinear  dynamics appear to be plausible in this setting, either through the type of dynamics
in agricultural production modeled by Carraro or through dynamics in the impact of nutrition on
productivity. The theory is compelling. However, f know of no empirical work testing for multiple
steady states in poor peoples' consumptions. Given that one or more of the equilibria will be unstable,
the necessary data could well be hard to find. (Panel data might offer some hope of identifying these
effects.)  Arguably the multiple equi'ibria are always there, but a famine is one of the few real-world
setting in which their potentially devastating consequences  can be seen clearly.
III  Markets and institutions
The last section pointed to ways in which even a seemingly small entitlment shock to poor
people can induce large changes in their survival prospects, and also how similar shocks can have
dissimilar outcomes. But what causes the changes in entitlements? Various markets and institutions
determine the factors-the  distribution of endowments, the structure of prices, and the pattern of
transfers-which  bear on the likelihood  that an exogenous  shock will turn into mass entitlement failure
20and hence famine. By and large these are the same markets and institutions which operate in normal
times.  Observers often point to their breakdown during famines. To understand famines we must
understand  the untypical perfornance of markets and institutions in poor countries.
I  Food markets
Food markets are often blamed for causing or exacerbating famines. 27 Famines in market
economies do not imply inefficiencies  by the usual Pareto  criterion;  a reallocation  that lets more people
live may make others worse  off. Entitlement  failures leading  to mass starvation  are not inconsistent  with
efficient resource allocation in a suitably modified version of the Walrasian model of a competitive
market economy (Coles and Hammond, 1995).28  Famines need not imply "market failure".
However, this observation will do rather little to subdue the concerns of the market's critics.
Even if efficient, one can abhor the market allocation during famines because of its sheer inequity;
Pareto efficiency is perfectly consistent with a highly inequitable and (by any reasonable assessment)
socially  sub-optimal  allocation. And concerns  about  the market's  efficiency  during a famine persist even
if the seeds of market failure during famines were there before the famine. The markets that actually
exist in famine-prone traditional agricultural economies are almost certainly incomplete markets, so
there will normally be scope for Pareto-improvements. 29
One source of market failure is that markets generally do not exist to permit trade in contracts
for future grain  delivery. Thus, current  trading decisions  are conditional  on expectations  about the prices
which will prevail in future spot markets. And so expectations formation will matter for the allocation
of consumption  over time and hence mortality. Those facing starvation now will naturally have a high
rate of discount. Yet even greater starvation in the aggregate may result without storage. In a market
economy, this will depend on how well stock holders predict future scarcities.  This is not a new
27  See, for example,  Bhatia's  (1967)  description  of "price  famines"  in India  during  the nineteenth  century.
Also see Greenough's  (1982)  study  of the famine  in Bengal  1943-44,  and the discussion  in Rashid  (1980).
Similarly,  there  were reports  of hoarding  by 'grain  barons' in Sudan  in 1985  (Steele, 1985).
28  The standard  model of competitive  equilibrium  assumes  that everyone  can survive without  trade.
Responding  in part to conjectures  in Desai  (1989),  Coles  and Hammond  (1995)  show  that Pareto  optimality  of
competitive  markets  can coexist  with some  individuals  dying  in equilibrium  because  they do not attain  some
minimal  consumption  level.
29  For a review  of this topic, in a development  context,  see, for example,  Stiglitz  (1988).
21observation, but (as with so much of the modem discussion of famines) had clear antecedents in the
nineteenth century debates over famine relief policy (Rashid, 1980).
In normal times we may tolerate a degree of market inequity or failure, because the cost of
avoiding it exceeds  the gain. The more interesting  question  in the present  context is whether  those same
features of markets can magnify adverse  external shocks. Anecdotes  abound of "panic buying" of food
in response to news of impending famine. For example, there were many stories of such behavior in
newspapers  during the lead up to the 1974-75  famine in Bangladesh  (Ravallion, 1987, Chapter 3). Can
such behavior turn the threat of famine into a reality?
Data have severely constrained efforts to address this question in famine-vulnerable  settings.
Bangladesh has been an important exception.  Survey data on rice price expectations of wholesale
traders and stock holders in Bangladesh rice markets shows little sign of informational efficiency
(Ravallion, 1987, Chapter 6).  The restrictions implied by the unbiasedness of one-day-ahead price
forecasts  are convincingly  rejected at the individual  level, with a tendency  to overestimate  price changes
indicated  for all sampled  traders. The random walk model of price forecasts  for a terminal date is also
rejected as a  generalization of traders' forecasting behavior.  Overall, the rational expectations
hypothesis is a poor characterization  of this market.
We do not have the benefit of surveyed  expectations  data during a famine nor even reliable data
on important  quantities,  such as stocks. But we can study  the effect on current  prices of new information
about future scarcities. Newspaper  reports  of flood damage to standing  crops resulted in higher current
price rises during the 1974-75  famine in Bangladesh, and this effect existed independently of future
prices (Ravallion, 1987,  Chapter  3). Price forecasting errors appear to have been positively correlated
with readily available information on damage to the future harvest.  Thus, rice hoarding prior to
anticipated food-availability decline was excessive when compared to the likely outcome under
competitive  conditions  with informationally  efficient  expectations. This appears to be the main reason
why rice prices rose so dramatically in the lean months before the main (1974-75) winter harvest; rice
prices more than doubled between  March and October of 1974, leading to a devastating contraction in
command over food amongst those with little endowment  to fall back on.  As is typical of the panic
stage after a speculative mania, rice prices fell almost as sharply in markets during the week or two
before the next harvest started  to arrive in November. And in the end it turned out that the harvest was
depleted by less that five percent over its previous level, which had been unusually high; it is even
22questionable whether output fell below trend. 30 Similar shocks to aggregate food availability in
Bangladesh before and since that famine, had nothing like the same disastrous  consequences.
The policies of the government  and principal  aid donors  appear to have worsened  matters. Rice
prices in Bangladesh are influenced by the government's foodgrain stock, as determined by previous
imports  (including  foreign  aid) and internal  procurement  efforts. Thus, expectations  of the effect of pre-
harvest crop damage on future prices require an assumption about the response of the domestic
government  and foreign governments  to shared information. The most plausible conclusion is that the
stockholders' high price expectations during the 1974-75  famine were premised on a belief that the
government  would be unable to implement  a suitable stabilizing  response  to the reported damage to the
future  crop. Donor  threats to cut food aid on foreign  policy  grounds in early 1974  helped fuel that belief.
It has also been  argued that accelerated  growth in the money  supply  helped fuel inflationary  expectations
(Chadha  and Teja, 1992). The failings  of foodgrain  markets thus appear to have stemmed in part from
(domestic and international)  public-action failures.
Informational  inefficiencies  need not destabilize  markets,  and considerable  instability  is possible
in an informationally  efficient market. Quddus and Becker (1994) show that the rice price formation
process in Bangladesh is consistent with the possibility of a speculative bubble even with rational
expectations. However, it is clear that the way rice markets worked in Bangladesh meant that the
combined effect of the crop damage from flooding and the external threats to food aid led to
considerable de-stabilization of prices and consumption. In the end, there was clearly enough rice to
avoid famine if only it had been better distributed for usage over time.
Concerns have also been raised about the spatial performance of markets in getting food from
surplus  to deficit  areas. Dynamic  analyses  of spatial price differentials  suggest  significant  impediments
to spatial market integration during famines; see Ravallion (1987, Chapter 5) in the context of the
Bangladesh  famine during 1974-75,  and von Braun et al., (1994, Chapter  5) in the context of the famines
in Ethiopia and Sudan in the mid-1980s. The causes appear to include unusual transport costs and a
variety  of higher  risks associated  with the famine conditions  (which most local transporters  would have
no opportunity  to insure against); these stemmed in part from disruptions to trade due to the famine or
30  There  are a number  of problems  in assessing  agricultural  output  for Bangladesh;  the statements  made
here  are based  on the careful  work  of Boyce  (1987). However,  they  are also consistent  with more  commonly
used sources,  as used  by Alamgir  (1980)  and Sen (1981,  Chapter  9)..
23its proximate  causes, and were exacerbated by faulty policy responses, such as deliberately  impeding
the flow of food to protect better off regions.
2  Labor and other markets
Food markets have been the focus of much of the literature.  Yet the markets for the things that
poor people sell will be just as important to the outcomes.  The capacity for work is the main asset of
poor people.  Naturally, when there is little inequality in access to land, the agricultural  labor market
tends to be thin.  In Asia, and increasingly in Africa, there is sufficient land inequality for the labor
market  to  be crucial  to the  impact of aggregate  shocks  on the rural  poor.  For example,  the  real
agricultural  wage rate  in terms of the food staple  fell dramatically  during  the  1974-75 famine in
Bangladesh (Figure 1), and landless agricultural workers, part-time farmers and village artisans were
the famine's  main victims (Alamgir, 1980; Sen, 1981).  There is evidence of a significant structural
break in the short-run wage adjustment process in Bangladesh during the 1974-75 famine, without which
the real wage rate in units of rice would have been almost twice as high during the worst months of the
famine (Ravallion, 1987, Chapter 4).  The famine appears to have been associated with a sizeable shock
to rural labor markets, originating in the contraction in agricultural employment that came with the
flooding.
A standard competitive model of the labor market would predict a lower real wage rate when
an aggregate shock reduces demand for labor.  However, such a model sits uncomfortably with other
observations  of  seasonal  underemployment  in  Bangladesh,  as  in  other  underdeveloped  agrarian
economies.'  One possible explanation for wage stickiness downwards is tacit collusion on the supply
side within the village.  This will be difficult to maintain during a famine in which the gains to defecting
from such arrangements  become high, and new workers appear on the local labor market who have
migrated from flood affected areas.  The sharp fall in the real wage rate during a famine may reflect a
failure of an aspect of the village "moral economy" (discussed further below).
We do not know whether the wage fell enough during the famine to eliminate  the famine
unemployment.  In all the academic literature and newspaper reports in Bangladesh on this famine, I
have never read a claim that workers during the famine no longer had trouble finding work, which one
31  Islam (1986) reviews evidence on this issue for Bangladesh.
24would have thought highly notable if true, given how much seasonal unemployment there appears to be
in nornal times.  It should not be presumed that even such a sharp fall in the real wage rate would be
enough to eliminate unemployment in this setting. A worker's productivity at a low food wage may be
so low that employers resist further wage cuts, as in the efficiency wage hypothesis.  That will depend
on the worker's other sources of consumption. Those amongst the poor with least non-labor endowments
will be the ones left to starve, for they will find that their best wage offers are undercut by other people
with  endowments  which can be consumed during the  famine so as to raise their productivity  to a
competitive  level  (Dasgupta and  Ray,  1986; McGregor,  1990; Dasgupta,  1993).32 Labor  market
responses during a famine may thus entail a "double whammy" for very poor people-their  consumption
falls directly because of the higher price of food, and it falls indirectly through the income effect (both
on wages and employment) of their diminished productivity.  This type of labor-market response can
readily generate the type of nonlinear dynamics in the evolution of poor people's  consumptions and
multiple  equilibria discussed in section II.  A variety of dynamic behaviors for consumption are then
possible in response to a labor-demand shock, including downward spirally contractions.  The dynamic
entitlement failure can entail both higher unemployment and lower real wage rates (Carraro,  1996).
Other markets are likely to matter to the transmission of aggregate shocks to the household level.
With the pressure on informal credit and risk-sharing arrangements, and the highly covariate nature of
the income shocks during famines, any existing formal credit markets will probably see rising interest
rates and/or rationing.  However, this is rarely mentioned in the literature, probably due to the fact that
formal  credit markets  are already thin in famine-vulnerable  economies, with borrowing  constraints
(particularly for the poor) being the rule rather than the exception.
With  incomplete  risk markets  (entailing  interdependence  of  production  and  consumption
decisions), a production input such as livestock can also be an important marketable asset which helps
protect the consumption of poor people. This is well-documented for the pastoral economies of the Horn
of Africa (Webb et al.,  1992; von Braun et al., 1994) and the Sahel (Khan, 1994).  Rosenzweig  and
Wolpin (1993) find evidence of the use of livestock for consumption smoothing in semi-arid areas of
32  While there is evidence from micro studies that undernutrition  reduces productivity, the empirical
relevance of any downward wage-stickiness  arising from such nutrition-based  productivity effects has been
questioned at  normal times even in poor rural economies (Bardhan, 1984, Chapter 4;  Swamy,  1996;
Subramanian  and Deaton, 1996). Nonetheless,  it can be conjectured that these effects are likely to be more
relevant during situations of unusually  low wages, as often observed  during famines.
25India.  The highly covariate nature of the shock during a famine means that large numbers of people
must simultaneously  sell their  livestock to buy  foodgrains, with a consequent  (often) sharp  fall in
livestock prices relative to foodgrains, and other goods (Sen, 1981; Kelly, 1992; Ulrich, 1993; von Braun
et al.,  1994; Khan,  1994).  This may be exacerbated by panic selling of livestock in anticipation  of
falling prices.
There  is still  much we do not know about (food and nonfood) market performance  during
famines.  We should clearly not assume that free markets will help buffer an initial shock's impact on
the poor.  The extent to which markets help or hurt will depend on the nature of the market failures in
normal times, and on how these interact with initial distribution and with the nature of the initial shock.
What  is needed most  is further  careful empirical  work on  how  markets  actually worked  in these
circumstances.
3  The "moral economy"  andfamines
There are undoubtedly a great many people who would not have died in a famine if only they
could have borrowed without rationing, at rates of interest which equated demand and supply for credit.
Credit and risk markets in famine-vulnerable settings appear to be less than perfect at the best of times.
And it is unlikely that they would work any better during a famine; indeed, there is (largely anecdotal)
evidence that existing market and non-market institutions for credit and insurance perform less well
during famines; patronage becomes scarce and "anti-social behavior"  increases, such as reneging on
familial and village obligations; 33 "Patron-client relationships, already weak, are found virtually to snap
during periods of severe food stress" (Agarwal, 1991, p.207).34
It is not surprising that famines can put considerable stress on normally  sustainable-albeit
imperfect-social  arrangements for credit and insurance in poor economies. Village societies can cope
33  The contraction  or collapse  of the various forms  of traditional  credit and risk-sharing  (including  patron-
client) arrangements during famines or other food crises has been noted by BRAC (1979), Dirks (1980),
Alamgir  (1980), Greenough  (1982),  Caldwell  et al., (1986),  Vaughan  (1987),  D'Souza (1988),  Agarwal  (1991),
Field (1993) and Adams (1993), amongst  others.
34  It has  also been  argued  that  the indigenous  moral  economy  is eroded  by the developing  market economy,
and  that  these are typically  settings  in which  no formal  (public)  safety net exists  to replace  the moral economy;
so longer-term  vulnerability  to famine  can be increasing  (see, for example, Sen's, 1981,  Chapter  8, discussion  of
the erosion  of traditional  support  systems  in the Sahelian  economy). This  topic takes us beyond  the scope of the
present  paper. Further  discussion  can be found  in Agarwal  (1991),  Platteau (1991) and Osmani (1996).
26to some extent with idiosyncratic risks through risk-pooling arrangements.  Such arrangements will
probably be less prone to moral hazard and adverse selection in traditional village and extended-family
settings  in which  participants are well known to each other.  Indeed, there  have been claims  from
microeconometric investigations that indigenous risk-sharing arrangements in poor agrarian economies
work well  in practice, though there is conflicting evidence from the same data of sizable exposure to
income shocks. 35 These arrangements cannot, however, be expected to cope with covariate shocks to
the risk-sharing group, as are likely to be common in a famine.  And even when the risk-sharing group
is large, or there  is a sizable idiosyncratic  component to the shock, in famine-prone  settings these
arrangements  must still be implementable without binding, legally enforceable contracts.  This fact
constrains  performance  for the poor, particularly  in spells of transient poverty, or when the threat of
destitution  reduces the probability of continued participation in the social insurance game.  Options
outside the household and village may become more attractive.
So there can be no guarantee that routine, mutually beneficial, cooperative behavior will survive
a famine-that  will depend on the initial conditions (including preferences) and the size of the shock.
Some strands of the traditional network of support will break more easily than others;  for example,
Greenough (1982) notes that longer-term attachments were less likely to be broken during the Bengal
famine.  Nonetheless,  simulations suggest that seemingly small perturbations  to the parameters (the
extent of risk-aversion and the discount rate) of a repeated informal insurance game amongst purely self-
interested parties can entail a large change in the realizable gains (Coate and Ravallion,  1993).
The disruption of community and familial reciprocity and/or benevolence  is often (though not
always) associated with migration (Jodha, 1975; D'Souza, 1988), though it is not clear what is the cause
and what is the effect here.  When group-based insurance fails, migration is certainly one response.  But
migration  can also  help  cause  the breakdown,  since the  village-support  game  relies  on  repeated
interaction amongst people who come to know and trust each other; the large scale migrations observed
during many famines may mean, however, that new players come on the scene who are likely to treat
it as a one-shot game.  Again a rapid collapse of informal risk-sharing arrangements can be expected.
35  Townsend  (1994)  argues  that  data for three Indian  villages  are consistent  with near-perfect  risk-sharing.
However, on applying  alternative estimation  methods  to the same  primary data set, Ravallion  and Chaudhuri
(1996) find that consumptions  are quite sensitive  to income changes.
27This point also illustrates  the pervasive, but often neglected, externalities involved in famines.
In various ways, individually  rational responses to the threat of starvation (of which migration is one
example) can aggregate into an enhancement of that threat.  One way is through the disruption of
socially-based  support mechanisms premised on a limited capacity for collective action; another way
is through enhanced  exposure to infectious  diseases in crowded  relief camps. Individual  efforts to cope
with life-threatening  hunger can blow-up into an even greater aggregate threat. Though the view that
mass starvation is just a simple  sum of many individuals'  independent  hungers is questionable, there is
still little hard evidence on these issues.
4  Failures of public action
Even with well informed  and well intentioned  policies, governments  and other agencies in poor
countries  can face severe infrastructural,  administrative and logistical constraints on their capacity for
action.  This has been a common problem in famines in underdeveloped  and/or war torn economies.
Inadequate rural infrastructure  and communications has often been identified as a contributing factor
to famines,  and a severe constraint on their relief. 36 Complex problems such as famines may so strain
infrastructure and  administrative capabilities that a  sharp deterioration in performance becomes
inevitable. This may well reflect  past failures  of public action (such as neglecting rural infrastructure).
There have also been serious short-term public action failures. First there are policy failures
resulting from faulty theories or misinformation.  There have been many examples.  The British
Government's faith during the nineteenth century in non-intervention  in food markets during famines
almost certainly made matters worse, by deterring public action to improve on the distributional
outcomes of unfettered  markets (Ambirajan, 1978;  Rashid, 1980;  Dreze, 1990a). At the other extreme,
the forced collectivization  of agriculture,  and associated  food procurement  policies implemented under
the Soviet Union's  first five-year  plan resulted in a severe famine in rural Ukraine in 1930s (Dalrymple,
1964;  Dando, 1981). Similar policies in Ethiopia  from the mid-1970s are believed to have contributed
to the famine of the mid-1980s  (Devereux, 1993b, Chapter 10). And the collapse of food entitlements
in China  during 1959-61  is believed  to have been instigated  by the destructive  effects on food production
of the rapid industrialization  policies implemented  as part of the "Great Leap Forward", compounded
36  See, for example,  Dreze  (1990a)  on famines  in British  India,  Berry  and Downing  (1993)  on droughts
in Africa  during  the 1980s,  and Jansson  et al., (1987)  and Kumar  (1990)  on the Ethiopian  famine  of 1984-85.
28by an urban bias in food distribution and failures of statistical reporting (Ashton et al., 1984; Riskin,
1990;  Lin and Yang, 1995). Milder  interventions  have also gone badly wrong  at times. There have been
a  number of  descriptions of how governmental interventions in  agricultural markets enhanced
vulnerability  to famines in Africa  (Jansson  et al., 1987;  Vaughan, 1987;  Maxwell, 1991;  Stryker, 1993).
Other common examples of this type of public-action failure are the attempts made to prevent food or
people moving in response to famines (Quddus and Rashid, 1991; Deveraux, 1993b,  Chapter 10).
Secondly, there are public-action failures that arise when those in power may not share the
objective  of avoiding  or relieving  famines. In some famine-prone  economies,  the government's  survival
appears to have little to do with its ability to secure the basic consumption  needs of those governed.
Indeed, higher poverty during famines may often come side by side with absolute, as well as relative,
gains to more powerful subgroups  of the nonpoor. Thus the incentives  facing  political leaders can work
against effective famine avoidance or response.
An extreme,  but not uncommon,  form of this type of public-action  failure is when a government
knowingly uses famine as a weapon against it's (external and internal) enemies (Dando, 1981; Keen,
1991;  Macrae and Zwi, 1992;  de Waal, 1993). But even  when the famine is not itself the weapon, it can
be an entirely predictable  by-product  of governmental  policies, such as when militerization  destroys the
ability  of an economy and society  to cope with drought (Deveraux, 1993b, Chapter 10). Public-action
failure through denial or obfuscation  of the signs  of famine has been associated with some of the worst
famines in terms of lives lost, including the Ukraine famine of 1932-33 (Dalrymple, 1964),  and that in
China during 1959-61 (Ashton et al., 1984; Riskin, 1990); in both cases the government refused to
acknowledge  the problem, or to seek external assistance, and the outside world knew very little about
it until many years later.
Within this category of deliberate public-action failures are also examples in which the threat
of famine was recognized, but for other reasons. It has been claimed that the host government during
the Ethiopian  famine in 1983-85  exploited  perceived  donor sympathy  for the victims to lobby for famine
aid intended for other purposes, or to free up foreign exchange for other purposes including buying
weapons  (Cutler, 1993;  Kloos and Lindtjmrn,  1993). And the problem need not be confined to the host
governments.  One major donor government is claimed to have used famine aid to Ethiopia as an
instrument of foreign policy, with the aim of overturning a government it did not like on ideological
grounds (Shepherd, 1993).
29IV  Famine policies
Famines  demonstrate  that market and non-market institutions cannot be relied upon to always
operate in ways which will adequately  buffer an external  shock's impact  at the individual  level. Indeed,
under certain conditions, considerable magnification of the shock is possible in the chain of events
leading to famine. What are the lessons for policy, and research on policy?
1  Better governance
The solution  to some of the public-action  failures identified in section III is clear enough: base
the policy response on a realistic and undogmatic  assessment of how the specific economy works and
build  the physical and institutional capacity for making the response work. Examples of how this can
be done are discussed later.
The solution to deliberate public-action failures is less clear.  One factor identified in recent
literature is the extent to which information  can flow freely and public pressure for action be expressed
without  recrimination. In addition to open formal political institutions, an independent  press has been
seen to have an important  role in avoiding  famines  (Dreze  and Sen, 1989;  Ram, 1990). And  the negative
effects a government having the ability to suppress news and criticism have also been identified; for
example,  this appears to have been a contributing factor to the unusual severity of the Chinese famine
of 1959-61 (Sen, 1983) and the Ethiopian  famine of 1984-85 (Gill, 1986; Jansson et al., 1987). Also
attempts to suppress information often come hand in hand with deliberate misinformation, such as
unconvincing  promises,  which can even make matters  worse by further  desabilizing  markets (Ravallion,
1987; Quddus and Rashid, 1991). There is also evidence  that democracy is instrumentally important
to avoiding famines;  in Africa since  about 1980,  more democratic  countries  have been less likely to have
a famine (von Braun et al., 1994),  though that correlation  is based on very few degrees of freedom (until
1990 only two or three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa could reasonably be called democratic).
However,  while it is plausible  that open political institutions  and a free press constrain  the scope
for this type of deliberate  public-action  failure, it is not clear what the policy instruments  are here. The
extent to which information  and criticism can flow freely is often under the control of the same agents
whose preferences inhibit famine relief.
External levers might be identified, if donors and international agencies were willing to apply
appropriate conditionality to their aid and concessional lending. Multi-lateral  aid agencies and (non-
30governmental and private) voluntary agencies can be trusted to have a firmer commitment to saving
lives during a famine than some governments, though here too governments can try to manipulate or
suppress these agencies, as has happened in relatively illiberal political environments (Adam, 1993).
Some of these agencies appear unaware of-or  reticent to exploit-their  own bargaining power to
improve host-government policies, preferring instead to disburse famine aid as rapidly as possible
without conditions. It should not be assumed that unquestioning  handouts of "humanitarian aid" will
best serve humanitarian ends.
Clearly more  research is needed  on the political and institutional  dimensions  of famine causation
and relief. For now, it is believable that the increasing  political liberalization we are seeing in famine-
prone economies  will at least constrain  the possibilities  for this deliberate public-action failures. Other
constraints  are also emerging;  the "CNN  factor" is one, whereby  the international  visual media can now
zoom in rapidly  on trouble spots  even when the local regime is trying to suppress information. If these
recent trends continue, then it is likely that political leaders will have a greater demand for sound
economic  analysis  in formulating  anti-famine  policies. The rest of this section  reviews issues  pertaining
to specific policies aimed at relieving and preventing future famines.
2  Early warning and rapid response
Aggregate  food  availability  has traditionally  been  the main indicator  used for predicting  famines.
The recent literature  has suggested  that similar initial  conditions  of aggregate  food supply can entail  very
different outcomes. Even a highly sophisticated  forecasting model, and accurate data, may produce
unreliable predictions of how much  FAD will impact on the welfare of poor people in famine-
vulnerable settings. What can be done?
Arguably the best place to look for signs of impending  famines  is in the variables which directly
determine the entitlements of poor people (prices, wages, employment, and agricultural yields) or
variables which indicate  underlying  entitlement failures though induced behavioral responses (such as
consumption  of wild foods or unusual  migration). Much has been learnt about potential early-warning
indicators  by studying behavioral  responses  to contractions  in food entitlements (Torry, 1988; Corbett,
1988; Kelly, 1992; Khan, 1994). While such research has revealed promising indicators in specific
settings, the degree of that specificity and the heterogeneity in behavioral responses even within one
well-defined area and socio-economic group (let alone problems of data quality and administrative
31feasibility) has constrained efforts to find robust "universal"  early-warning indicators (Corbett, 1988;
Davies, 1993).
The public response to early warnings must also be timely. Late responses are costly in lives
and money. A greater reduction in mortality  can generally  be achieved  with given aid if it is distributed
more evenly over time (given the likely concavity of the survival function, as discussed in section II).
Adverse effects on producers'  future price expectations and, hence, future food availability can also be
reduced with a more timely response. Often, however, the costs of a delayed response are not incurred
by those making the decision of when to respond. For example, various distress signals (consumption
of wild foods, unusual migration,  selling of livestock  to buy food and high food prices) were evident for
at least 12 months prior to the main external  interventions  in Ethiopia in late 1984 (Gill, 1986; Jansson
et al., 1987; Kumar, 1990).
There are examples  of how rapid and effective  public responses  to signs of famine have almost
certainly averted disaster. These include Kenya and Botswana in the mid-1980s, and Bangladesh in
1979 and 1984. But amongst famine-vulnerable  countries, post-Independence  India has provided the
most well-documented examples of effective early warning and public response. The Famine Codes
developed in the nineteenth  century originally  relied largely on monitoring foodgrain supply indicators
(such as failed rains), though this broadened  to include food prices and unusual population movements.
The Madras Famine Code of 1883 recommended monitoring grain prices as an indicator of famine
(Rangasami, 1985), and the Bengal Famine Code of 1918 outlined an elaborate early warning system
(Currey, 1984). These Famine Codes  formed the germ of the post-Independence  early warning system,
but  the  public response  system was  developed greatly (Government of  India,  1989).  Local
administrators  report  signs of famine;  their efforts are monitored, and an open press is rarely reticent to
play a "watchdog" role (Ram, 1990). Local officials maintain the capability for rapid response. The
administrative integration of warning and response functions,  combined with political will and a free
press, have undoubtedly been important to India's success at avoiding famines since Independence,
despite numerous droughts (Dreze, 1990a). However, as a number of observers have noted, India's
success at fighting chronic poverty and hunger has been more disappointing
323  On the role of aggregate  food availability
It has been argued  that an increase  in aggregate  food availability  is not called for to stop a famine
which was not itself caused by a decline in aggregate availability (Bowbrick, 1986). And the belief
seems to have occasionally been put into practice.  For example, the sluggish response of some aid
agencies to early warnings of the 1983-5  famine in Ethiopia  has been attributed  to their assumption  that
private food surpluses  in the country  were sufficient  to maintain aggregate consumption, in spite of the
drought (Gill, 1986)."  Of course, the aid agency's ex ante assessment of food supply is bound to be
imprecise  and it now appears  likely that availability  was seriously low in Ethiopia in 1984-85  (Kumar,
1990). But that is not the issue here. Even if aggregate  domestic availability  is not threatened,  can there
be a case for emergency  interventions  aimed at increasing the supply of food to the domestic economy
in response to signs of an increase in starvation?
A number of arguments can be made in favor of increasing aggregate food availability in
response to a famine, even if it not caused by FAD. 3"  Consider the stylized case of starvation arising
from an adverse  shift in food distribution,  as a result of which the poor end up with a lower share of an
unchanged  aggregate. In principle,  the absolute  consumption  levels of the poor could be restored either
by restoring the previous food distribution function, or by increasing aggregate availability. It is not
difficult to imagine situations in which the first option is unfeasible in the (crucial) short-run.
To  give another illustration, suppose that private  storage is deemed to  be excessive.  A
government can try to deal with this by sending the police out to bash up 'hoarders', as happened, for
example, during the Bangladesh  famine. This may work, but one suspects  that it is more effective as
a public relations exercise than as a means  of increasing  current  food consumption.  And one must also
appreciate the importance of the government's behavior to  the formation of stockholders' price
expectations.  In these circumstances, the immediate goal should be to  take actions which  lead
stockholders  to revise downwards  their expectations  of future  prices. A believable  undertaking  to import
food would almost certainly do this.
37  Another  well  documented  example  is the  Great  Bengal  Famine  of 1943  in which  the sluggish  response
from the authorities  appears  to have  been  due in part to the fact that they  could  find litde sign  of FAD  (Sen,
1981,  Chapter  6).
38  Contrary  to the claims  of Bowbrick,  that is entirely  consistent  with  Sen's  (1981)  arguments.
33Is there also a case for promoting  domestic  food production as part of a longer-term  strategy for
preventing famines? The role of commercialization  of agriculture and the promotion of export crops
(both food and non-food)  has been much debated. It is sometimes  argued that this will divert resources
away from the domestic production of food, and expose poor farmers to even greater risk of food
entitlement  failure (see, for example, Lappe  and Collins, 1977). There have been cases in which a new
export crop has increased exposure to risk; groundnut in the West African Sahel is an example
(Devereux, 1993b, Chapter 9).  However, as a generalization,  the view that export-crop production
creates  famines is questionable;  if by producing  a cash crop instead  the rural poor can afford  to buy more
food, and the markets and infrastructure  are adequate  for getting  the food to them from elsewhere, then
that will reduce their vulnerability to famine. 39 Similar comments apply to the idea that the highest
priority for famine-vulnerable  areas is to promote food production  so as to be self-sufficient  in food; in
regions where the land is much more suitable to cash crops that can be a formulae for a severe food
entitlement  failure. Nor does self-sufficiency  in food appear to be an ecologically sound principle for
tropical agriculture (Stewart, 1988).
Agriculture and rural development can play an important role in reducing vulnerability to
famine, both in providing extra insurance (such as through agricultural diversification, and non-farm
jobs in lean seasons) and longer-term  development. Unfortunately, past development policies (both
pricing and spending)  have typically been biased against this sector (Krueger et al., 1988). The policy
lesson is clear.
4  Distribution policies
Although  the case is often strong  for increasing  aggregate  food availability  during a famine,  food
handouts  need not be the best form of intervention  from the point of view of minimizing  mortality. Cash
or coupon payments  to potential  famine victims can provide more effective relief than the usual policy
of importing and distributing food (Reutlinger, 1988; Dreze and Sen, 1989; Coate, 1989; Sen, 1990;
Maxwell  and Templer, 1994). Under competitive  conditions, the case in favor of cash relief is strong
if either food prices in the affected region are below world prices at the border (since, of course,
recipients will then be able to purchase more food locally with the cash aid than the aid agency can
39  For evidence  on the effects  of agricultural  commercialization  on poverty  and hunger  see the various
papers  in von Braun  and Kennedy  (1994).
34obtain with the same money  on world markets) or if private  traders can deliver the food more efficiently
than the aid agency. The case in favor of cash relief is less obvious if local markets perform poorly,
though even then the policy switch may be desirable; for example, cash relief can result in lower
mortality  than direct food aid even if the local food trade is monopolized,  provided that (amongst other
conditions)  traders  can still deliver food at lower cost than the aid agency  (Coate 1989). Some observers
have seen that traders  get the food to affected  areas quicker  than governments  or aid agencies. 40 Savings
in storage  and handling  costs can mean that cash has a higher transfer benefit to recipients. It can also
help avoid the need for recipients to congregate in crowded and unhealth relief camps.  The rapid
monetization of food aid to finance entitlement-protection  programs has helped some famine-prone
countries better avoid famines. 4'
Whether in the form of food or cash relief, the effect of aid on mortality will depend greatly on
how it is distributed  over time and between  people. Governments  and agencies involved  in famine relief
face the problem  of how to allocate a fixed  quantity of emergency  food  aid. Indicators  of aggregate  food
availability  in specific regions sometimes  used, though (for the same reasons that FAD is questionable
theory of famine causation)  this may not mean that the transfers go to those in greatest need, and there
is at least one documented  case in which focusing on local foodgrain  output shortfalls  led the aid agency
to miss those in greatest need (Webb and Reardon, 1992,  on the 1983/84  drought in Burkina Faso).
Food allocation according  to more direct indicators  of "need" is often advocated and used, and
guidelines  for doing so have been laid down by some NGOs and UN agencies. 42 In practice this often
means that handouts are based on readily observed individual  or group attributes such as assessments
of age, height and weight.  This would seem more likely to achieve better outcomes than targeting
according to food output shortfalls,  though finer targeting can also entail higher costs; we know little
about the precise trade-offs involved during famines.
40  See, for example,  Caldwell  and Caldwell  (1992),  referring  to the drought  in the Sahel  in the early
1970s.
41  See Dreze and Sen's (1989)  discussion  of Cape  Verde's policies  in which  food aid is sold on open
markets  and used  to finance  cash  transfers  for protecting  the  command  over food  of poor  people  in the presence
of severe  droughts.
42  For example,  the Oxfam  Health  Unit (1984)  advocates  the use of need  indicators  such  as weight-for-
height  indicators. Also  see Seaman  and Rivers  (1988).
35A thorny question  arises in this context. As a general rule, the mortality minimizing allocation
of a given supply of food over a population will equalize the food consumption slope of the survival
function across all persons. The optimal allocation to each person will be implicitly a function of
relevant  personal attributes  of that person, interpretable  as his or her 'needs' (Ravallion, 1987, Chapter
7).  Implementing an (unconstrained)  optimal allocation of given aid may be very far from being
feasible in practice. However, it is not even clear that an optimal allocation from the point of view of
aggregate  mortality  would look much like the guidelines typically laid down. There can be no general
presumption that the mortality minimizing handout of food or cash is an increasing function of need.
Indeed,  the opposite  will hold whenever  persons  in greater  need have lower consumption  slopes of their
survival  functions. 43 On moral grounds one may prefer to give more food to those in greater need, but
one may also have to come to terms morally  with the fact that this could well involve more people dying
than strictly necessary with the given amount of food available.
Direct intervention to improve health-such  as through disease treatment and control, water
purification  and improved  sanitation-will  not only reduce mortality directly, but may entail that other
policies which enhance food entitlements  will have larger marginal impacts on survival  prospects. If
so, then the converse  will also hold;  in various ways greater  command over food will enhance the impact
of health-based interventions.'  Or effective (cash or food) transfers may obviate the need for health-
based intervention,  such as when relief reaches  villagers  before migration  begins, thus reducing the need
for crowded relief camps where infection becomes more likely. The literature contains discussions  of
such synergies  between health and more  conventional  food-  or cash-based  interventions  (see for example
Young  and Jaspers, 1995). But as yet the relationships  are not well understood, or quantified to a point
where one can give firm guidance  on the priorities that should be attached to each mode of intervention
when aiming to minimize famine mortality.
The administrative  capability  for implementing  indicator-based  targeting  of interventions  during
famines is limited in many settings. This has led to extensive use of one of the oldest forms of famine
relief policy, namely the provision of unskilled employment  to anyone who wants it at low wages on
43  Also see Keen  (1992).
44  Non-food  goods  may  also matter;  for example,  Rivers  (1988)  argues  that better clothing  and shelter
will  reduce  nutritional  requirements.
36public works projects. 45 The attraction  of this policy has not been the value of the outputs produced,  but
its incentive  effects, notably  the potential for "self-targeting"  (given that those not in need are unlikely
to want to do such work at the wages offered) and that incentives for escaping poverty by other means
are  preserved (Besley and  Coate,  1992).  Furthermore, in  famines arising from a  collapse  of
employment, the forgone incomes of relief-work  participants will be low, and hence the relief can be
cost-effective. By allowing a separation  of those able to work from those not, and by targeting on other
indicators of need amongst the latter group, this type of policy can be an important component of a
comprehensive  relief strategy (Dreze and Sen, 1989).
The body of experience and evidence on public works schemes offers compelling support for
the belief  that they can have an important  role in famine relief. That does not mean  that they will always
be the most cost-effective option; if the intervention  is delayed too long then the poorest may be least
fit to work; and under certain conditions forgone incomes and non-wage costs may mean that such
schemes will only dominate informationally  feasible alternatives if the assets created have sufficient
value to the poor, such as by helping  to prevent  the deterioration  of rural infrastructure  and other assets
during the famine (Ravallion and Datt, 1995). There have been remarkably  few rigorous evaluations
of the gains to the poor from specific safety-net interventions  in poor countries.
Recent literature  has also emphasized  the limitations  of analyzing  relief policy options in partial
equilibrium  terms; an income transfer is often assumed to leave all prices and other sources of income
unchanged.  This is unlikely to hold when considering wide-spread transfers of income in market
economies. In distorted economies,  transfers can have significant multiplier effects on the incomes of
the poor. For example, in a dualistic  economy  with mobility between  a rural sector  and an urban sector
with unemployment,  the multiplier effect from transfers to the rural poor will be large when the wage
elasticity of demand for labor in agriculture is low (Ravallion, 1  990b). There appears to be potential
for exploiting  such general equilibrium  multiplier effects in policy design aimed at achieving the most
cost effective  relief aid. For example,  relief work is generally  confined  to alleviating  poverty from rural
unemployment  in lean periods. This may reduce  the transfer  benefit to the poor, once market responses
45  Though  intervention  in food  markets  was discouraged,  relief works schemes  were prominent  in the
"Famine  Codes"  in British  India  (Bhatia,  1967;  Dreze, 1990). The aim was  to provide  local employment  at a
subsistence  wage  to all who  wanted  it. On  the use  of this  policy  in famines  in Africa  see Dreze  (1990b)  and von
Braun  et al., (1994, Chapter  8). For a survey  of the literature  on these  schemes  see Ravallion  (1991).
37are considered. Indeed, under this restriction,  the policy cannot be expected to achieve the most cost
effective  aid-in  the sense of maximizing  the recipient's  transfer  benefit for a given outlay  on the policy.
5  Stabilization policies
Public buffer stocks  have been a popular stabilization  policy. Stocks  are raised (lowered) when
aggregate  food availability  is high (low). The size the stock needed, and hence the cost of the scheme,
will depend  on the degree of stabilization  desired  and how private storage decisions respond (Newbery
and Stiglitz, 1981). By stabilizing  prices, such policies reduce incentives for private speculation. And
so private storage  will be displaced. The extent of this will depend  on the way foodgrain  markets work.
At one extreme, buffer stocks will generally be ineffective as price stabilizers in competitive markets
in which agents hold rational  expectations  of price movements. But plausible  market imperfections  may
or may not enhance the case for stabilization  through a conventional  buffer-stock  policy. For example,
the specific informational inefficiencies  suggested by the evidence for Bangladesh imply clear limits
to the use of this type of policy due to the potential  for speculative attack during famines. 46 The lesson
is clear: it is crucial that the markets are confident that future food supply is secure.
Trade is another way of doing so.  Unrestricted international  trade has been advocated as an
alternative  famine relief policy to buffer stocks (Reutlinger,  1982; World Bank, 1986). The essence of
the argument is deceptively simple: by raising the local food price, shocks to domestic consumption
opportunities should be at least partly offset by an increase in imports or fall in exports provided that
trade is unrestricted. Here too qualifications  are called for. First, trade can have the opposite effect in
a "slump famine" (Sen, 1981) in which the proximate cause of the famine is an endowment collapse
rather than an increase  in the local price of food; then the income effects in the famine-affected  region
may well entail food export. 4'  Cash relief can help here in preventing  food export (Dreze  and Sen, 1989;
46  The  usual  policy  of selling  from  buffer  stocks  at times  of high  prices,  may  fail at sufficiently  low levels
of public storage. Indeed,  at times  of high prices, if public  stocks  are believed  to be so low as to generate
highly  inflated  expectations  of future  prices  in response  to supply  shocks  then  a further  reduction  in the public
stock  will  be price  de-stabilizing.  The Bangladesh  government's  efforts  to raise  public  confidence  in its stock
and trade position  during 1974  may well  have  been its (albeit  unsuccessful)  response  to a plausible  form of
informational  inefficiency  in rice markets  (Ravallion,  1987,  Chapter  7).
47  The often-quoted  example  of this effect is for British  India  around  the tum of this century. External
trade  was  unrestricted,  and the sub-continent  was a net  exporter  of foodgrains.  However,  while  income  effects
dampened  the stabilizing  response  of trade in this period,  trade was  still consumption  stabilizing  in its effect
38Sen,  1990).  Second, even when trade stabilizes aggregate consumption, it may destabilize the
consumptions of certain sub-groups of the population; the effects of free trade on the interpersonal
distribution  of consumption  are also of concern. If (as is common)  restrictions  on trade are used to keep
domestic food prices below world prices then free trade could well have adverse short-run effects on
distribution. There may well be a significant  adjustment  problem, leading to increased vulnerability of
certain groups in the short-term. Further research is needed on the dynamics of such effects.
An effective but  affordable (and hence sustainable) stabilization policy in  famine-prone
economies  with poor infrastructure  will probably  combine  buffer stocks  and regulated  trade. Emergency
stocks can be held in key locations,  notably  where vulnerable  groups  are found and transport  is a serious
problem.  And a relatively open external trade regime should be allowed for foodgrains.  This will
probably  require regulation  through stabilizing  trade taxes (rather  than quantitative  restrictions)  to avoid
high domestic exposure  to fluctuating  world prices and it may need to be backed up by a monetary fund
for emergency  food imports,  such as through the IMF's Compensatory  and Contingent  Financing  Facility
(Huddleston et al., 1984). None of these policy options come with guarantees. Problems of under-
funding, poor management,  and lack of integration  with the early warning system can greatly reduce  the
gains from stabilization  policies. 48 Yet there have been successes  too. By combining such stabilization
schemes with relief work schemes or other targeted transfers (as discussed above) famines have been
avoided in economies facing the shocks which might otherwise  have spelt disaster. 49
6  Trade-offs?
Comprehensive  poverty-reduction  strategies  for low-income  countries  rightly emphasize  the role
played by social safety  nets even in growing  economies. 50 Policy makers may be very willing to forgo
(Ravallion,  1987,  Chapter  7).
48  See, for example,  Jones' (1994)  discussion  of Ethiopia's  food  grain reserve  policy.
49  Well-documented  recent  examples  include  Maharashtra  in Western  India  during 1970-73,  Cape  Verde
during  the 1970s,  Kenya  during  the  mid-1980s,  Zimbabwe  in the early 1980s,  Botswana  in both the early  and
late 1980s  (Dreze  and Sen, 1989;  Dreze,  1990a),  Ethiopia  in 1987  (Kloos  and Lindtbrn, 1993),  and  Bangladesh
in 1979  and 1984  (Crow, 1984;  Osmani, 1990).
5  See, for example,  World  Bank  (1990,  Chapter  6), Lipton  and Ravallion  (1995),  and Binswanger  and
Landell-Mills  (1995).
39other objectives of development to assure greater security against famines. However, it is far from
obvious that effective policies against famine entail a positive cost to other commonly espoused
objectives of development, including economic growth and environmental  protection.
The literature on famines reviewed here has suggested that failures of both market and non-
market institutions lie at the heart of famine causation; so it can be argued that famines can be
ameliorated  by longer-term  development  policies  which strengthen  the social and economic  institutions
(both governmental  and non-governmental)  which help protect poor people  from economy-wide  shocks.
Evidence  in the famines literature  and elsewhere  also suggests  that an effective  social safety net
for protecting poor households from severe shocks is consistent with longer-term goals of economic
growth and environmental protection.  Arguments that greater current security against famine can
promote growth have come from two main sources. First, it can be argued that credit constraints make
it difficult for survivors  to restore  their productive assets after the famine, entailing irreversible lasting
damage to livelihoods (Jodha, 1975; Agarwal, 1991; Osmani, 1996). Yet without an adequate safety
net some will be forced into drawing  down their productive  assets. There is some evidence  that famines
have resulted in an increase in wealth inequality, through increased concentration of land ownership
(Khan, 1977;  Alamgir, 1980;  both on Bangladesh)  and livestock in pastoral regions of Africa (Osmani,
1996). Thus, after the famine the economy  will have a higher  number  of credit-constrained  households
who are unable to take up productive  investments  in physical  and human  capital.  There is some evidence
from cross-country  studies that higher initial inequality entails lower subsequent growth rates (see the
Bruno et al., 1995, survey).
Putting these pieces together, it can be conjectured that temporary famines can create more
permanent distributional shifts which entail lower long-term growth rates. By the same reasoning, a
safety  net which can prevent  the depletion  of productive  assets by poor people will entail a higher longer
term rate of both growth and poverty reduction.
The second source of evidence  comes from normal (non-famine)  times in settings like those in
which famines have ocurred.  There has been recent compelling evidence from microeconometric
investigations  that exposure  to uninsured  risk influences  poor peoples' investment  decisions  and, hence,
prospects of escaping poverty (Rosenzweig  and Binswanger, 1993; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993;
Morduch, 1993, 1994; Chaudhuri, 1995). For example, even though expected income may be higher
from a new seed variety, extra exposure to uninsured risk may prevent adoption.
40While the above arguments  and empirical results are suggestive,  more research is needed on the
ways in which unisured risks and borrowing  constraints  handicap  the longer-escape  from poverty.  What
we seem to lack most at present is a credible assessment of the likely dynamic gains from safety-net
interventions,  so as to better inform  public choices about how much to invest in such policies.  Even if
we found no longer-termn  gains, we would still want to prevent famines. However, it is not implauible
that a number of the policies discussed above for achieving better protection for poor people-as  part
of a famine relief strategy-will  enhance the future prospects of escaping poverty.  Whether that
argument is right in practice, and what quantitative  gains can be expected from specific interventions,
will of course depend on how effective the specfic interventions  are in protecting poor people, as well
as the extent of the dynamic gains from extra insurance. Further research on this topic could have
important implications for assessments  of the case for safety-net policies.
There are potential synergies  with other  aspects  of development  policy. Improved  infrastructure
(both better roads and marketing  arrangements)  has also been identified as a key factor in the success
stories in reducing  vulnerability  to famines. 5'  Having good rural roads will certainly not guarantee that
the available  food will get to those in need, or even that it will move in the right direction, but without
them there may be little chance of it doing so.  Besides promoting food-market integration, there is
evidence to suggest that improved rural transport allows a diversification of rural income sources,
reducing risk and promoting both farm and non-farm growth. 52 A similar comment applies to certain
policies for promoting agricultural and rural development, such as reducing the (direct and indirect)
51  Walter  and Schofield  (1989)  argue  that in England  by the late seventeenth  century  improved  farming
methods  and better spatial  integration  of food markets  due to improved  transport  and marketing  had resulted
in higher  farm  yields  and more diversified  food  production  in the country  as a whole,  and greater  protection
from localized  and  crop-specific  harvest  failures. In parts  of continental  Europe,  however,  progress  on all these
fronts  had been slower,  and vulnerability  to famines  persisted.
52  On the  positive  effects  of infrastructure  on agricultural  output  in India  see Binswanger  et al., (1993).
Datt  and Ravallion  (1995)  find  that states  of India  with  better rural infrastructure  saw  higher  longer-term  rates
of rural poverty  reduction,  controlling  for other  differences  in initial  conditions  and exogenous  time-varying
factors. Also  see McAlpin  (1983)  who  argues  more informally  that the diminished  vulnerability  to droughts
in India  during  the first  20 years  of this century  was  due in part to rural infrastructure  development  (including
the expansion  of the railways).  (Though  also see the comments  by Appadurai,  1984,  and Rangasami,  1994.)
A not dissimilar  story can be told about  Indonesian  economic  development  since  the 1970s;  Indonesia  was
probably as vulnerable  to famines  as Bangladesh  in the 1960s,  but this has changed greatly, and rural
development  (particularly  in Java)  appears  to have  had an important  role (Ravallion,  1995).
41taxation of agriculture, and certain human resource interventions."  There probably will be some
changes  in priorities if one aims to prevent famines. But since  past policies do not appear to have been
growth maximizing, the growth cost of the required change in policies need not even be positive.
What about the environmental  consequences? It has been argued that vulnerability to famines
is increased  by the lack of well-defined  property  rights, and the failures  of other means of assuring  quasi-
cooperative solutions to the problem of allocating common-property  resources (Dasgupta and Miler,
1995). In pastoral  economies,  over-grazing  can result,  and the open-access  problem  often also underlies
the process of deforestation. When these processes have continued over a long period, the ecological
system has little resistance.  If individual and social coping strategies also fail then the people who
depend on that ecological  system can be extremely vulnerable  to even a modest drought. The ensuant
famine  can itself entail ecological upheaval; for example, mass migration can have devastating
environmental effects.  These arguments suggest that environmental-protection  policies can thus be
viewed as complementary  to reducing famine vulnerability in the longer term.
There are a number  of other potential synergies  between policies  to protect from extremes such
as famines,  and longer-term  progress  in other aspects  of development. Some of the more effective  social
safety nets for alleviating  poverty  in non-famine  times evolved out of experience in famines.  Examples
include the "Employment  Guarantee Scheme" in the India state of Maharashtra which evolved out of
the famine relief efforts in the early 1970s, and the targeted food distribution and cash transfers found
in Botswana  (Dreze and Sen, 1989).  Recent discussions  of disaster-relief  policy have  also emphasized
the synergy  with longer-term  development  objectives  (see, for example,  Anderson  and Woodrow,  1989).
With limited resources, many sharp trade-offs will undoubtedly be faced in detailed policy
choices. But it should  not be presumed  that effective  policies for reducing  vulnerability  to famines will
come at a cost to other development  objectives. While a strict separation  of "relief" and "development"
is clearly untenable,  a far deeper  understanding  is still needed of the extent and nature of the synergies.
Public action to prevent famines need not wait for the results of that research. But it is research that
could matter greatly to a proper assessment  of the extent of the world's public resources that should be
devoted to the task.
53  On the taxation  of agriculture  see Krueger  et al., (1988). On human  resource  policies  see Behrman's
(1990) survey.  For more general  discussions  see World Bank (1990), Dasgupta  (1993), and Lipton  and
Ravallion  (1995).
42V  Conclusions
Famines have defied simple explanations as well as geographic boundaries.  They have
happened  under both socialist and capitalist economic  systems. They have happened with and without
declines in food supply, and with and without wars or unusual political or social instability.  An
objective and holistic view of the determinants of individual survival prospects in economies under
stress offers the greatest hope of both understanding  why famines happen, and of usefully informing
domestic and international  public  action on how best to avoid or relieve them. That is the main insight
that economic analysis can offer to replace the heavy reliance in the past on often doubtful "single-
cause" explanations for famines.
Economic  analysis  can help understand  famines. But economists can also learn from famines.
While they are dramatic events,  they can start quite undramatically. Under  certain conditions,  the threat
of mass starvation can emerge from seemingly small shocks to an economy, or from a steady--even
slow-decline  in average living standards. And similar,  even large, shocks  in similar settings can have
very different consequences. Market  and non-market  (including  governmental)  institutions which may
work quite adequately,  though not perfectly,  in normal times can easily turn even a moderate aggregate
shock into a devastating  blow to some poor people.
Famine can thus be viewed as a tragic magnification of normal market and governmental
failures. The nonlinearities,  cumulative  effects,  and aperiodic  behavior,  that can transform a shock into
mass starvation  appear to be intrinsic  features of quite nornal economies-rather than peculiar features
of highly distorted or badly damaged economies. They are there always, but normally hidden from
view. And they can surface in any number of ways.
While famines do not lend themselves to easy prediction, there are some common elements.
Entitlement  failure is one.  While famines have happened  with and without crop failures, every famine
appears  to have entailed  a collapse in the legal command over food of at least some sub-groups within
society,  either through a loss  of endowment  or a contraction  in the amount of food that can be acquired
from given endowments.
Looking  deeper into  the causes of entitlement  failure we also see some common  elements albeit
at a more aggregate  level. Weak social and physical infrastructure,  weak unprepared government, and
a relatively closed political regime, all enhance vulnerability to famine.  Arguably the same factors
constrain longer-term poverty reduction.  Recognizing the contingent nature  of the market and
43institutional failures that underlie famines points to implications for both their relief and prevention.
And it is doubtful  that effective  policies  for preventing  famines  come at any significant,  or even positive,
cost in terms of other development  objectives.
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